As global tensions and nuclear threats periodically resurface in the media, many people are left wondering whether any place on Earth could truly be considered safe in the event of a large-scale nuclear war. While experts generally maintain that such an event is unlikely, the destructive power of modern nuclear arsenals makes the question hard to ignore. Interestingly, some analysts suggest that survival after a nuclear conflict might depend less on avoiding direct explosions and more on factors like geography, climate, and food security. According to investigative journalist Annie Jacobsen, two countries stand out as potentially offering better odds for long-term survival: New Zealand and Australia. Her argument focuses not just on avoiding the initial blasts, but on surviving the aftermath, particularly the global famine predicted by the theory of nuclear winter.

Jacobsen discussed this topic during an appearance on The Diary of a CEO, hosted by entrepreneur Steven Bartlett. Drawing on scientific research, she explained that countries in the Southern Hemisphere, like New Zealand and Australia, might be better positioned to survive the consequences of a large-scale nuclear exchange. The primary concern is nuclear winter, a theory suggesting that massive firestorms caused by nuclear explosions would send soot and smoke into the atmosphere, blocking sunlight and drastically cooling the planet. This could lead to a collapse in agriculture, especially in the Northern Hemisphere, where major breadbasket regions like the American Midwest and Eastern Europe would experience years of crop failure. Jacobsen referenced projections indicating that such widespread agricultural collapse could result in far more deaths from famine than from the explosions themselves.

A key piece of research supporting Jacobsen’s claims comes from atmospheric scientist Owen Toon, whose team has modeled the climatic impacts of nuclear conflict. Simulations have shown that even a limited nuclear exchange could inject enough soot into the atmosphere to disrupt global food production. In the worst-case scenario, full-scale nuclear warfare could leave billions facing starvation. In addition to the drop in temperatures, the depletion of the ozone layer and increased ultraviolet radiation would make outdoor agriculture extremely dangerous or impossible in many regions. As a result, survivors in heavily affected areas might be forced to go underground, struggling to survive amid dwindling food supplies. Jacobsen argues that countries with resilient agricultural systems, lower population densities, and geographic isolation—like New Zealand and Australia—would stand a better chance of weathering the prolonged disruptions caused by nuclear winter.

Geography plays a central role in Jacobsen’s analysis. Both New Zealand and Australia are located far from the Northern Hemisphere’s largest nuclear powers and major military targets, which would likely be the first areas struck in an all-out nuclear conflict. While neither country is completely removed from global alliances or strategic considerations, their relative isolation means they are less likely to be directly targeted compared to regions with high concentrations of military infrastructure, such as missile silos, bases, and command centers. For instance, in the United States, missile fields in states like Colorado, Montana, and North Dakota are considered potential targets for high-yield nuclear strikes aimed at neutralizing retaliatory capabilities. These strikes would cause immediate devastation, with fireballs, shockwaves, and radioactive fallout impacting vast regions.

In contrast, publications like Newsweek have explored which American states might be least likely to experience direct impacts in a nuclear conflict. Areas farther from known nuclear infrastructure could avoid the worst of the initial blasts. However, the fallout effects would still spread globally due to prevailing wind currents, and even regions spared from direct attack would not escape the broader consequences of nuclear war. Food systems, energy grids, and international trade would likely collapse, exacerbating humanitarian crises worldwide. This is why Jacobsen and other analysts emphasize the importance of agricultural viability over simply being outside the blast zone. Countries capable of producing sufficient food domestically, especially those with temperate climates less prone to extreme cooling, would have a comparative advantage in sustaining their populations.

Despite these projections, experts continually warn that no location would be completely immune from the ripple effects of a large-scale nuclear war. Global supply chains are deeply interconnected, and any environmental disruption would be accompanied by economic collapse. Even regions that appear more favorable, like New Zealand and Australia, would face challenges related to infrastructure strain, political instability, and potential refugee flows. The broader takeaway from these discussions is not necessarily about relocating to a safer region, but about focusing on prevention. Nuclear winter research underscores the devastating humanitarian costs of nuclear conflict and highlights the importance of arms control and diplomatic efforts. While countries like New Zealand and Australia may be better positioned to endure the aftermath due to their geographic and agricultural advantages, the ultimate reality is sobering: in a full-scale nuclear exchange, no place would be truly safe. The only truly secure outcome is preventing such a conflict from occurring in the first place.